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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
  
 Defendant Insurance Company of North America ["INA"] 
terminated plaintiff William J. Miller from his job after fifteen 
years of employment.1  Miller alleges that he was discriminated 
against on the basis of his age in violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act ["ADEA"], 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 
(1988).   
 At trial, the district judge instructed the jury that 
it could return a verdict for Miller only if he proved that age 
was "the sole cause" of INA's decision.  After the jury returned 
a verdict in INA's favor, Miller appealed, asserting that the 
district court improperly charged the jury regarding his burden 
of proof.  We hold that in ADEA cases that do not qualify for a 
burden shifting charge under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228 (1989), district courts should instruct the jury that 
                                                           
1At oral argument, the parties stipulated that INA was the 
plaintiff's employer at all times relevant to this appeal.  At 
trial, however, both INA and CIGNA Corp. were defendants. 
3 
the plaintiff's burden is to prove that age played a role in the 
employer's decisionmaking process and that it had a determinative 
effect on the outcome of that process.  Since it is not necessary 
for the plaintiff to prove that age was the sole cause of the 






 Miller was hired in 1975 as an assistant to INA's Chief 
Financial Officer.  In that position, he directed INA's 
reinsurance operations at the Newark Reinsurance Company, created 
a financial processing service center, and directed the 
production of summary financial documents.  After serving as Vice 
President and Director of INA's Special Risk Facility, Miller was 
promoted to Senior Vice President, Field Operations.  He created 
a new organization, managed a $200 million budget, and supervised 
over 8,000 employees.  At this point in his career, Miller was 
compensated at pay grade sixty-one and his superior consistently 
evaluated his performance as exceeding expectations.   
 After his promotion to Senior Vice President, Miller 
was asked to join a special team of other executives called 
IMPACT.  IMPACT's mission was to identify major strategic issues 
and market strategies for INA's Property and Casualty Division. 
Caleb Fowler, Chief Financial Officer of the Property and 
Casualty Division, and Richard Hoag, Chief of Human Resources, 
told Miller they would find him a permanent position at the 
4 
conclusion of the project.  When IMPACT concluded in late 1984, 
Miller was assigned to a special project on reinsurance 
collection.   
 Upon completing the special project on reinsurance 
collection, Miller was appointed to the position of Senior Vice 
President of the Underwriting Division.  In this position, Miller 
managed four departments, handled complaints from agents and 
regulatory agencies, prepared state filings and annual budgets, 
and managed a $70 million annual budget.   
 In late 1988, Miller's supervisor, Jack Morrison, 
advised Miller that he should search for another job, both inside 
and outside the company, because his position might be 
eliminated.  In March of 1989, Miller's position was eliminated. 
Miller's superior, Nord Bjorke, sent him to Richard Hoag to 
receive a special assignment reducing real estate costs in the 
Property and Casualty Division.   
 One year later, Hoag informed Miller that, despite his 
success in reducing real estate costs, his position as "real 
estate czar" was being terminated.  Hoag advised Miller that he 
could assist Robert O'Neil, head of Real Estate in the Corporate 
Staff, with special projects.  In November of 1990, Miller was 
informed that this position was being eliminated and that he 
would be terminated at the end of December.  At the time he was 
terminated, Miller was fifty-eight years old and had been 
downgraded to pay grade fifty-nine.  At no time during 1990 was 
Miller informed about five vacancies at the company for which he 
might have applied.   
5 
 The first vacancy was for the position of Vice 
President, Filing and Regulation.  Defendant announced that 
Darrell DeMoss, age forty-two, had been selected.  Miller had not 
known of the position and contends that he was qualified for it 
because, as Senior Vice President, Finance and Administration, he 
supervised the Filing and Regulation function.  Defendant asserts 
that Miller was not considered because the position required 
legal analysis and Richard Franklin, the hiring manager for this 
position, decided to hire an attorney.  Miller notes, however, 
that his name was not included on the list of nonlawyer 
candidates who were considered but disqualified, and that the 
previous Vice President, Filing and Regulation, was not a lawyer. 
 The second vacancy was in the position of General 
Manager of CIGNA Reinsurance Company, United Kingdom.  Among the 
desired qualifications were "[w]ork experience with either United 
Kingdom accounting practices or reinsurance accounting practices 
and principles . . . ."  App. at 712.  Miller asserts that this 
position involved the same responsibilities he had when he 
supervised the Newark Reinsurance Company.  James Godorecci, who 
was in charge of hiring for the position, acknowledged that he 
wrote the job qualifications with Michael Durkin, age thirty-
five, in mind and that he never considered Miller for the 
position.  INA contends that Miller lacked the desired academic 
credentials, work experience and knowledge of United Kingdom 
accounting practices.   
 The third vacancy was for the position of Senior Vice 
President, Finance Systems and Administration, in the Claims 
6 
Department.  Qualifications desired for the position included: 
broad knowledge and experience in the Property and Casualty 
business; knowledge of financial measures and objectives; 
credibility and the ability to work with other managers; skill in 
influencing managers and implementing strategy; and effective 
verbal and written skills.  Miller contends he satisfied these 
requirements because of his management experience.  James Engle, 
the hiring manager for this position, testified Miller was not 
qualified because he did not have a strong math and statistical 
background, and was not familiar with loss control and 
statistical monitors.  The company asserts that Victor DiFelice, 
age thirty-eight, was better qualified for the job.   
 The fourth vacancy, for the position of Head of 
Strategy Implementation, was filled by Ronald Peters, age forty-
nine.  The company conceded that Miller was qualified for the 
job, but maintained that Peters was better qualified.   
 The fifth vacancy was for the position of Vice 
President, Property and Casualty Marketing.  Hiring manager 
Thomas Cobb appointed Cynthia Cole-Dougherty, age thirty-eight. 
Job qualifications included an ability to conduct market studies, 
market research, competitive analyses and segmentation studies. 
INA asserts that, although Cynthia Cole-Dougherty did not have 
insurance experience, one of the primary considerations in the 
hiring decision was a desire to hire from outside both the 
company and the industry.     
 During trial, the district judge asked counsel if 
Miller's was a "pretext" or "mixed motives" case.  This inquiry 
7 
made reference to the distinction between employment 
discrimination cases in which the plaintiff seeks to carry his or 
her burden by showing that the employer's tendered reason for the 
challenged action is a pretext for discrimination2 and cases that 
qualify for a mixed motives, burden shifting instruction under 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228.  Miller's counsel 
advised the district court that this was a "pretext" case. The 
district judge then "distribute[d] to counsel the questions [to 
be used] to submit the case to the jury. . . ."  App. at 610. 
After reviewing those questions, Miller's counsel stated that she 
had an objection.  Counsel cited Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 
S. Ct. 1701 (1993), and asserted that plaintiff's burden of proof 
under that case was to establish that age was "a determining 
factor," i.e., that it "made a difference" in the employer's 
decision.  App. at 612. 
 Notwithstanding this objection, the district judge 
instructed the jury as follows: 
 To recover under the pretext theory 
which the plaintiff asserts in this case, the 
plaintiff must establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that his age was the sole 
cause of defendants' failure to hire him into 
vacancies that became available and to 
terminate his position as a real estate czar 
in the last of those listings that I've put 
on the page that you have; that he was 
qualified and rejected for the positions in 
question solely because of his age. 
 
* * * 
     
                                                           
2See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 
(1981); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).  
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 If the defendants articulate a 
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for his 
rejection, the plaintiff at all times retains 
the ultimate burden of persuading you that 
the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against him because of his age. 
 
 * * * 
 
 The plaintiff under the law must prove 
that the discriminatory motive was the sole 
cause of the employment action. 
 
 In order to prove pretext, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant's reasons were 
false and that discrimination was the real 
reason, however, if you disbelieve the 
reasons put forth by the defendants to 
justify their decision, you may but are not 
required to find intentional discrimination. 
 
* * * 
     
 The plaintiff doesn't have to prove that 
the employer hated him . . . .  He has to 
prove that plaintiff's age was the sole 
determinative factor in the particular 
employment decision. 
 
App. at 673-77 (emphasis added).  At the conclusion of the 
charge, Miller's counsel renewed her "objection to . . . the 
verdict sheet. . . [and stated that] the question before them is 
whether age was a determinative factor according to Biggins." 
App. at 683 (emphasis added).  The district court declined to 
alter the charge. 
 During its deliberations, the jury sent the following 
message to the district judge: 
 The jury requests clarification on the 
meaning of defendants' employment decisions 
in question # 2. 
 
 Is the question which we are addressing 
(regarding discrimination based solely on the 
9 
plaintiff's age) focused on: a) Mr. Miller 
not being actively considered -- on the 
candidate slate, or b) Mr. Miller not being 
selected as the person to get the job, for 
each of the jobs a through e? 
 
App. at 691.  In response the district judge stated: 
[Y]ou must decide whether Mr. Miller's not 
being selected to get the job of Vice 
President of Filing and Regulation to take 
"a" and that job going to another person was 
a decision made by the defendants as a 
pretext for discrimination based solely on 
Mr. Miller's age. 
 
 "b" in the question sheet the question 
you have to decide is whether to give that 
job to the person who received it for the 
CIGNA (UK) position was made as a pretext for 
discrimination against Mr. Miller based 
solely on Mr. Miller's age and so on with 
regard to each of the other decisions in 2 a. 
considered separately[.] 
 
App. at 691-92 (emphasis added).  After two days of 





 We conduct plenary review when an appellant contends 
that the instructions to the jury, read as a whole, do not state 
the correct legal standard.  Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 
457, 462 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 186 (1993) (citing 
Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1202 (3d Cir. 1989)).  "[W]e 
will reverse if the instructions were capable of confusing and 
thereby misleading the jury."  Id. (citing Limbach Co. v. Sheet 
10 
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1259 n.15 (3d Cir. 





 Like Title VII which prohibits an employer from taking 
adverse employment actions against an employee "because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin," 42 
U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a)(1), the ADEA prohibits an employer from 
taking adverse employment actions against an employee "because of 
such individual's age."  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).  Not 
surprisingly, the ADEA jurisprudence concerning this prohibition 
has followed the Title VII jurisprudence interpreting the 
analogous prohibition.  Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 
469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).  A district judge in a case under 
either statute must, of course, instruct the jury in a manner 
consistent with Congress' mandate that the adverse employment 
action must have been taken "because of" the prohibited 
consideration. 
 The nature of the causal connection mandated by the use 
of the phrase "because of" in Title VII was a focus of the 
Supreme Court's opinions in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
                                                           
3Defendant argues that Miller failed to preserve his objection to 
the jury charge.  We disagree.  Miller's counsel objected, both 
before and after the district court charged the jury, that 
plaintiff's burden on the issue of causation was to show that age 
was a determinative factor, not the sole cause of the employment 
decision.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51; Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 
1379 (3d Cir. 1993) (in banc) (to preserve an objection to a jury 
charge, appellant must provide the trial judge with an 
opportunity to correct the erroneous charge). 
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228.  The members of the Court differed as to whether "because 
of" meant that the forbidden consideration must be a "but-for" 
cause (i.e., one without which the adverse employment action 
would not have been taken) or only that the impermissible 
consideration must have "played a motivating part" in the 
decision to take that action.  See id. at 244.  All members of 
the Court agreed, however, that "because of" did not mean "solely 
because of."  See, e.g., id. at 241, 284. 
 Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justices 
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, took the position that "because 
of" required only a finding that gender or some other prohibited 
consideration played a part in the decision to take the 
challenged action.  He explained their position in part as 
follows: 
We take these words to mean that gender must 
be irrelevant to employment decisions.  To 
construe the words "because of" as colloquial 
shorthand for "but-for causation," as does 
Price Waterhouse, is to misunderstand them. 
 
* * *  
 
The critical inquiry . . . is whether gender 
was a factor in the employment decision at 
the moment it was made.  Moreover, since we 
know that the words "because of" do not mean 
"solely because of,"7 we also know that Title 
VII meant to condemn even those decisions 
based on a mixture of legitimate and 
illegitimate considerations.  When, 
therefore, an employer considers both gender 
and legitimate factors at the time of making 
a decision, that decision was "because of" 
sex and the other, legitimate considerations 
-- even if we may say later, in the context 
of litigation, that the decision would have 




             
 
7Congress specifically rejected an 
amendment that would have placed 
the word "solely" in front of the 
words "because of."  110 Cong.Rec. 
2728, 13837 (1964). 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240, 241 (emphasis added). 
 Justice Kennedy, writing in dissent for himself, the 
Chief Justice, and Justice Scalia, concluded that "because of" 
required "but-for" cause.  In doing so, he likewise rejected the 
suggestion that it was intended to mean "solely because of": 
 By any normal understanding, the phrase 
"because of" conveys the idea that the motive 
in question made a difference to the outcome. 
We use the words this way in everyday speech. 
And assuming, as the plurality does, that we 
ought to consider the interpretive memorandum 
prepared by the statute's drafters, we find 
that this is what the words meant to them as 
well.  "To discriminate is to make a 
distinction, to make a difference in 
treatment or favor."  110 Cong.Rec. 7213 
(1964).  Congress could not have chosen a 
clearer way to indicate that proof of 
liability under Title VII requires a showing 
that race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin caused the decision at issue. 
 
 Our decisions confirm that Title VII is 
not concerned with the mere presence of 
impermissible motives; it is directed to 
employment decisions that result from those 
motives.  The verbal formulae we have used in 
our precedents are synonymous with but-for 
causation.  
 
* * *  
 
 We are told . . . that but-for cause is 
not required, since the words "because of" do 
not mean "solely because of."  Ante, at 241. 
No one contends, however, that sex must be 
the sole cause of a decision before there is 
a Title VII violation.  This is a separate 
13 
question from whether consideration of sex 
must be a cause of the decision.  Under the 
accepted approach to causation that I have 
discussed, sex is a cause for the employment 
decision whenever, either by itself or in 
combination with other factors, it made a 
difference to the decision.  Discrimination 
need not be the sole cause in order for 
liability to arise, but merely a necessary 
element of the set of factors that caused the 
decision, i.e., a but-for cause. 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 281-82, 284 (emphasis added). 
 Justice O'Connor, while concurring in the result 
reached in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, disagreed with 
the plurality's reading of "because of" and agreed with that of 
the dissent: 
The legislative history of Title VII bears 
out what its plain language suggests:  a 
substantive violation of the statute only 
occurs when consideration of an illegitimate 
criterion is the "but-for" cause of an 
adverse employment action.  The legislative 
history makes it clear that Congress was 
attempting to eradicate discriminatory 
actions in the employment setting, not mere 
discriminatory thoughts. . . .  Senator Case, 
whose views the plurality finds so persuasive 
elsewhere, responded: 
 
"The man must do or fail to do 
something in regard to employment. 
There must be some specific 
external act, more than a mental 
act.  Only if he does the act 
because of the grounds stated in 
the bill would there by any legal 
consequences."  Ibid. 
 
Thus, I disagree with the plurality's dictum 
that the words "because of" do not mean "but-
for" causation; manifestly they do." 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262-63.  In the course of her 
opinion, Justice O'Connor likened the relevant principles to 
14 
those involved in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), where the Court 
held that "the plaintiff was not required to prove that the 
challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory 
purposes."  490 U.S. at 268 (emphasis supplied). 
 Finally, Justice White, who also concurred in the 
judgment of the Court, looked to Mt. Healthy City School District 
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), for guidance in 
interpreting "because of."  In the context of a public employer's 
decision not to rehire an employee in part because of his 
exercise of First Amendment rights, the Court had there rejected 
a rule of causation that focused "solely on whether protected 
conduct played a part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in a decision 
not to rehire."  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 259.  Under the 
Mt. Healthy approach, the plaintiff was required to prove only 
that "the unlawful motive was a substantial factor in the adverse 
employment action," but there could be no liability if the 
defendant showed that it "would have reached the same decision    
. . . even in the absence of the protected conduct."  Id.  A 
necessary corollary to this approach, according to Justice White, 
was that a plaintiff does not have "to prove that the 
illegitimate factor was the only, principal, or true reason for 
petitioner's action."  Id. 
   We find it clear from the opinions in Price Waterhouse, 
and from the legislative history they cite, that Congress, by 
using the phrase "because of," did not mean "solely because of."  
Even if we did not have this guidance, however, we would be 
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reluctant to attribute to Congress an intention that an employer 
should be liable if a discharge decision is based solely on an 
employee's age and not liable if the discharge decision is based 
primarily on the employee's age but also on the fact that the 
employee's supervisor did not like his personality, hair color, 
or some other personal trait or conduct. 
 Having concluded that "because of" does not mean 
"solely because of," we now look to the governing precedents to 
determine the proper jury instruction in an employment 
discrimination case that does not qualify for a mixed motives, 
burden shifting charge under Price Waterhouse. 
 
IV. 
 The Justices concurring in the judgment in Price 
Waterhouse declined to apply to the situation before them the 
familiar rules for allocating the burdens of production and 
persuasion found in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 
450 U.S. 248 (1981).4  They viewed those cases as "pretext" cases 
                                                           
4As summarized in Burdine, those rules are: 
 
[First] the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence a 
prima facie case of discrimination.  Second, 
if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the 
prima facie case, the burden [of production] 
shifts to the defendant to articulate some 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employee's rejection.  Third, should the 
defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff 
must then have the opportunity to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant 
16 
and the case before them as a "mixed motives" case.  The Court 
held that, in cases where the plaintiff offers "direct evidence" 
of unlawful discrimination and the evidence as a whole permits a 
conclusion that both permissible and impermissible considerations 
played a role in the employer's decision, the plaintiff need only 
show that the unlawful motive was a substantial motivating factor 
in that decision.  If the finder of fact concludes that the 
plaintiff has carried this burden, the burden of persuasion 
shifts to the defendant to prove that the unlawful motive was not 
a but-for cause, i.e., that the same action would have been 
taken, because of legitimate considerations, in the absence of 
the unlawful motive.   
 The members of the Court concurring in the judgment in 
Price Waterhouse reached this result by different routes. 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens read the statute 
as imposing liability in any situation where the unlawful motive 
was a "motivating" factor, but recognized an "affirmative 
defense" where the employer shows that the same actions would 
have been taken in the absence of the unlawful motive.  Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244, 250.  Justice O'Connor agreed with 
the three dissenters that the statute required but-for cause as a 
predicate to liability, but favored a burden shifting rule for 
cases in which the plaintiff "show[s] by direct evidence that an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
were not its true reasons, but were a pretext 
for discrimination. 
 
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 
(1981) (citations omitted). 
17 
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision." 
Id. at 276.  In such cases, the burden shifts "to the employer to 
justify its decision," -- "to show that the decision would have 
been the same absent discrimination."  Id.  "[W]here a plaintiff 
has made this type of strong showing of illicit motivation, the 
fact finder is entitled to presume that the employer's 
discriminatory animus made a difference in the outcome, absent 
proof to the contrary from the employer."  Id.  Justice White 
found it unnecessary "to get into a semantic discussion on 
whether Mt. Healthy . . . creates an affirmative defense."  He 
agreed with Justice O'Connor, however, that the plaintiff in 
Price Waterhouse had made the requisite showing that sex was a 
substantial factor in the employer's decision and that the 
"burden of persuasion then should have shifted to Price 
Waterhouse to prove" the same decision would have been made 
absent the unlawful motive. 
 For present purposes, there are two important things to 
note about the several opinions in Price Waterhouse.  First, a 
majority of the members of the Court did not endorse the 
plurality's view that Title VII imposed liability whenever a 
prohibited factor played a motivating role in the challenged 
decision.  Justices O'Connor and White and the three dissenters 
rejected, in the words of Justice White, "a rule of causation 
that focused solely on whether protected conduct played a part, 
substantial or otherwise, in a decision."  490 U.S. at 259. 
Second, while the holding of the Court fashioned a special rule 
reducing the plaintiff's burden of persuasion in a defined 
18 
category of Title VII individual discrimination cases, a majority 
of the Court endorsed views of Title VII that would leave 
plaintiffs in other individual discrimination cases with the 
burden of showing but-for cause. 
 All members of the Court now seem to agree that a 
showing of but-for causation by the plaintiff is required in ADEA 
cases that do not call for special treatment under Price 
Waterhouse.5  In Hazen Paper Co., 113 S. Ct. 1701, the plaintiff, 
like the plaintiff here, claimed that he had been discharged 
because of his age in violation of the ADEA.  The Supreme Court 
was called upon to address the relationship between the standard 
of ordinary liability under the ADEA and the standard of 
liability for liquidated damages under the provision of that Act 
authorizing such damages for "willful" violations.  With respect 
to the former, Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, 
reviewed the case law applicable to disparate treatment (i.e., 
individual discrimination) cases and concluded as follows: 
Whatever the employer's decisionmaking 
process, a disparate treatment claim cannot 
succeed unless the employee's protected trait 
actually played a role in that process and 
had a determinative influence on the outcome. 
Id. at 1706. 
                                                           
5Section 107 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(m), provides that "an unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that [a 
prohibited consideration] was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the 
practice."  Miller does not contend that this provision is 
applicable to ADEA cases.  We have today held in Hook v. Ernst & 
Young, ____ F.3d ____ (3d Cir. 1994) that section 107 does not 
apply to any case in which the alleged conduct giving rise to the 
claim occurred before the passage of the 1991 Act. 
19 
 With respect to the standard of liability for 
liquidated damages, the Court held: 
We therefore reaffirm that the Thurston 
definition of "willful" -- that the employer 
either knew or showed reckless disregard for 
the matter of whether its conduct was 
prohibited by the statute -- applies to all 
disparate treatment cases under the ADEA. 
Once a "willful" violation has been shown, 
the employee need not additionally . . . 
prove that age was the predominant rather 
than a determinative factor in the employment 
decision. 
Id. at 1710. 
 We find support in Hazen Paper for our earlier 
conclusion that "because of" does not mean "solely because of." 
If an ADEA plaintiff need not show that age was "the predominant 
factor" in order to establish liability for liquidated damages, 
surely such a plaintiff does not have to show that age was the 
sole cause of the challenged decision in order to establish a 
right to normal forms of relief.  We also believe Hazen Paper 
provides an authoritative answer to our second inquiry.  A 
plaintiff in an ADEA case who does not qualify for a burden 
shifting instruction under Price Waterhouse has the burden of 
persuading the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence 
that age "actually played a role in [the employer's 
decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on the 
outcome" of that process.  Id. at 1706.  
 
V. 
 Contrary to INA's insistence, the foregoing conclusions 
are not inconsistent with our holding in Griffiths v. CIGNA 
20 
Corp., 988 F.2d 457.  Griffiths was a Title VII case in which the 
plaintiff, a Jamaican immigrant, had been denied a promotion and 
had filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission asserting that CIGNA's decision was based on his 
national origin.  In the six months prior to the filing of this 
complaint, CIGNA had experienced a series of thefts and had 
conducted an investigation.  The report resulting from this 
investigation, issued shortly after Griffiths' EEOC complaint, 
implicated Griffith in the thefts.  He was terminated for the 
stated reason that he had failed to cooperate with the 
investigation.  Griffiths filed suit alleging that he was 
discharged in retaliation for his EEOC complaint. 
 Following a trial at which Griffiths introduced 
evidence tending to show that CIGNA falsely had accused him of 
the thefts and that the stated reason for his discharge was a 
pretext to cover a retaliatory motive, the trial judge charged 
the jury that CIGNA would be liable "if retaliation was 'a 
motivating factor' or 'one of the reasons' for Griffiths' 
discharge."  988 F.2d at 468.  On appeal, we held that it was 
error for the district court to require Griffiths to show that 
the unlawful motivation played only a role in the challenged 
decision.  
  Our opinion in Griffiths recognized that, under Price 
Waterhouse, the correct wording of a causation instruction to a 
jury differs depending on whether the case before the court is a 
"mixed motives" or a "pretext" case.  Only in a "mixed motives" 
case is the plaintiff entitled to an instruction that he or she 
21 
need show only that the forbidden motive played a role, i.e., was 
"a motivating factor."  Even in such cases, we noted that such an 
instruction must be followed by an explanation that the defendant 
may escape liability by showing that the challenged action would 
have been taken in the absence of the forbidden motive. 
 We first concluded that Griffiths had "failed to submit 
any evidence that [could] fairly be said to 'directly reflect' 
the alleged retaliatory motive for his termination."  Id. at 470. 
Accordingly, he was not entitled to a burden shifting instruction 
under Price Waterhouse.  We next concluded that all Title VII 
individual discrimination cases which do not qualify for a Price 
Waterhouse instruction are governed by "the Burdine pretext 
standard."  Id. at 470 n.13.  Our holding was as follows: 
As this case properly is characterized as a 
pretext case, the court should not have 
charged the jury that retaliation could be 
only "a motivating factor" or "one of the 
reasons" for Griffiths' discharge. 
 
Id. at 472.  We reaffirm this holding today. 
 
 In the course of our opinion, we went on to discuss 
"the Burdine pretext standard."  We found "some inconsistency 
within this circuit" with respect to the language used to 
describe the required causation in a pretext case.  We noted that 
in Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.), 
cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987), an in banc decision of 
this court, we held that an ADEA plaintiff "need not prove that 
age was the employer's sole or exclusive consideration, but must 
prove that age made a difference in the decision."  Id. at 897. 
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We further noted that a long line of panel decisions of this 
court followed this "but for" approach and required a showing 
that the prohibited motive was "a determinative" factor.  See, 
e.g., Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1079 (3d Cir. 
1992); Billett v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Bruno, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990); 
Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 726 (3d. Cir. 1988); Blum 
v. Witco Chemical Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 1987); and 
Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984).  On the other hand, we noted 
that our decision in Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 
764 F.2d at 175 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 
(1986), spoke of the concept of but-for cause as being 
inconsistent with a charge using the phrase "the determinative 
factor."  Id. at 176, n. 1 (emphasis in original).  Even 
Bellissimo, however, was consistent with the proposition that the 
plaintiff in a pretext case need not prove that the prohibited 
motive was the sole cause of for the adverse employment action. 
This was apparent from the following segment of that case which 
we quoted in Griffiths: 
 
Interpreting Title VII to require proof of 
"the determinative factor" is inconsistent 
with the "but-for" causation test, insofar as 
plaintiff would be required to show that the 
discriminatory motive was the sole reason for 
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the action taken.  More than one "but for" 
cause can contribute to an employment 
decision, and if any one of those 
determinative factors is discriminatory, 
Title VII has been violated.  See Lewis v. 
University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d at 917 n. 
8.   
988 F.2d at 471 (emphasis in original).   
 Immediately following this review of our case law, our 
opinion in Griffiths includes the following, admittedly cryptic, 
observation upon which the district court here relied in giving 
its "sole cause" instruction: 
[W]hile we recognize that in our pretext 
cases we have stated in passing, without 
focusing on the matter, that the 
discriminatory motive need not be the sole 
factor causing the employment decision . . . 
it is clear that in pretext cases the claim 
is that the discriminatory motive was the 
sole cause of the employment action and 
therefore it is inappropriate to state that 
the plaintiff only need show that the 
discrimination played "a motivating" or "a 
substantial" role. 
988 F.2d at 472 (emphasis in original). 
 For several reasons, we do not understand this sentence 
in Griffiths to mandate a charge in this case requiring the 
plaintiff to show that the impermissible factor was the sole 
cause of the adverse employment action.  First, while the term 
"sole cause" is used, the purpose of this sentence in the opinion 
is to make the point that our prior cases refusing to require a 
showing that the discriminatory motive was the sole cause are not 
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inconsistent with our holding that "it is inappropriate to state 
[in a pretext case] that the plaintiff only need show that the 
discrimination played 'a motivating' or 'a substantial' role."   
 Second, to read this sentence as the district court 
here did would make the panel's decision in Griffiths 
inconsistent with Hazen Paper as well as with our in banc 
decision in Chipollini.  A panel of this court is not free to 
ignore an in banc decision of this court.  See Siegel v. Alpha 
Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 53 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 
906 (1990) ("The defendants argue that we should overrule 
Chipollini.  Of course we do not have the power to do so -- a 
panel of this court may not overrule a decision of another panel. 
In addition, Chipollini was decided by this court sitting in 
banc, which makes doubly frivolous this invitation to overrule 
it."); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 707 F.2d 702, 
720 (3d Cir. 1983) (Sloviter, J., dissenting) ("Even if the 
Master had relied upon the presumption in favor of 
deinstitutionalization, it was one mandated by in banc decisions 
of this court, which a panel is not free to disregard."); cf. 
Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1 (only the court in banc may overrule the 
published decision of a previous panel).  Moreover, a decision of 
this court that conflicts with a subsequent decision of the 
Supreme Court does not remain binding precedent in this court. 
See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 953 F.2d 44, 46 (3d 
Cir. 1991) ("Ordinarily, a panel of this court is bound to follow 
the holdings of published opinions of prior panels of this court 
unless overruled by the court in banc or the holding is 
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undermined by a subsequent Supreme Court case."); Frangos v. 
Doering Equip. Corp., 860 F.2d 70, 72 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Although a 
cogent argument could have previously been waged based on past 
precedent within this circuit, the Supreme Court has recently 
rendered a decision making the Appellee's position untenable."). 
 Finally, it is no longer necessarily true, even if one 
thought it to be so at the time of Griffiths, that the trier of 
fact in a pretext case is limited to a choice between findings 
that the alleged discriminatory motive or the employer's 
nondiscriminatory explanation was the sole cause of the 
employment action.  At the time we decided Griffiths, it was 
permissible to view all pretext cases as presenting only two 
possibilities: the fact finder could conclude either that the 
plaintiff had succeeded in proving that the employer's 
explanation was a pretext for discrimination, or that the 
plaintiff had failed to so prove.  Under this view, if the 
plaintiff proved the employer's proffered reason was pretextual, 
the trier of fact presumed, as a matter of law, that the 
impermissible cause alleged by plaintiff was the sole cause of 
the employer's decision. 
 The Supreme Court recently has instructed that this 
bipolar view of pretext cases is inaccurate.  A finding that the 
employer's nondiscriminatory explanation is a pretext permits, 
but does not require, the trier of fact to conclude that the 
employer discriminated against the plaintiff based on the ground 
alleged.  St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). 
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 In St. Mary's, the plaintiff, an African-American, had 
been demoted and ultimately discharged by his employer.  He 
brought suit under Title VII, asserting that the employer's 
actions were the result of racial animus.  The employer insisted 
it took these actions because plaintiff threatened his superior 
and permitted his subordinates to break institutional rules.  The 
district court, as the trier of fact, found that the threatening 
conduct and rules violations had occurred, but concluded that 
neither these events nor the plaintiff's race were the real 
reason for plaintiff's demotion and discharge.  Rather, the 
district court concluded that "although [the plaintiff had] 
proven the existence of a crusade to terminate him, he [had] not 
proven that the crusade was racially rather than personally 
motivated."  Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 
1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 
 The court of appeals, viewing pretext cases as bipolar, 
ruled that, once plaintiff proved the employer's proffered 
reasons were pretextual, he was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th 
Cir. 1992).  The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the 
trier of fact's rejection of the employer's proffered reason for 
its action did not compel the conclusion that race was the sole 
cause of the employment decision.  Rather, the record evidence 
supported three possible causes: race, threats and violations of 
the employer's rules, and personal animosity.  The Supreme Court 
ruled that the trier of fact was entitled to draw from the record 
evidence whatever inferences that evidence would support.  Since 
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the district court concluded that the explanation advanced by the 
employer was a pretext, it could have further inferred that there 
was an impermissible motive to hide.  It was not required to do 
so, however.  If the district court inferred that personal 
animosity was the cause of the demotion and discharage, that, 
too, was permissible. 
 We think it clear from the Supreme Court's opinion in 
St. Mary's that the trier of fact in a pretext case, where the 
record will support it, may choose not to accept either party's 
litigating position as reflecting the whole truth.  This may, as 
in St. Mary's, take the form of a conclusion that the adverse 
action was taken for a reason other than the reasons urged by the 
parties.  It may also take the form of a conclusion that the 
alleged discrimination and the employer's nondiscriminatory 
explanation both played a role in the employer's decision.  If 
the plaintiff, for example, argues that he or she was discharged 
because of age and the employer insists that it was because of 
the plaintiff's record of absenteeism, the trier of fact may 
conclude that the plaintiff's absenteeism record played a part, 
but that the plaintiff would not have been fired if he or she 
were twenty years younger. 
 In some cases, the nondiscriminatory reason advanced by 
the employer may involve such turpitude that the only rational 
choices for the trier of fact are the plaintiff's explanation or 
the defendant's.  If the plaintiff alleges age discrimination and 
the employer asserts that the plaintiff embezzled $100,000, for 
example, it would clearly not be reversible error to give an 
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instruction giving the jury the choice between age as the sole 
cause and embezzlement as the sole cause.  A rational trier of 
fact could not believe that the plaintiff embezzled $100,000 and 
at the same time conclude that the plaintiff would not have been 
discharged but for his or her age.  In other cases, however, 
where the record will support an inference that both a legitimate 
and an illegitimate reason played a role in the employer's 
decision, the charge to the jury must provide for the possibility 
that it will find the employer's decision to be the product of 
more than one consideration.  In those cases, the court must 
charge, in accordance with Hazen Paper, that the plaintiff's 
burden is to show that the prohibited consideration played a role 
in the decisionmaking process and that it was a determinative 
factor in the outcome of that process.6 
 In this case, Miller alleged that, because of his age, 
he was not selected for various open high level management 
positions for which he was qualified, and that thereafter he was 
terminated.  For each of the open positions, Miller's employer 
asserted either that Miller was not qualified or was less 
                                                           
6We are here, of course, describing cases that involve mixed 
motives decisionmaking.  It is important to understand, however, 
that these cases do not fall within the legal category of "mixed 
motives" cases reserved for special treatment under Price 
Waterhouse.  As we explain more fully in Griffiths and Hook v. 
Ernst & Young, ___F.3d ___ (3d Cir., May, 1994), "mixed motives" 
cases in Price Waterhouse terms are cases not only where the 
record would support a conclusion that both legitimate and 
illegitimate factors played a role in the employer's decision, 
but where the plaintiff's evidence of discrimination is 
sufficiently strong to shift the burden of proof to the employer 
on the issue of whether the same decision would have been made in 
the absence of the discriminatory animus. 
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qualified than the person hired.  Based on the evidence presented 
at trial, the jury could well have concluded that the employer 
took both qualifications and age into account.  It might have 
found, for example, that Miller was qualified for one or more of 
the open positions, but that his credentials did not sufficiently 
distinguish him from the competing managers to overcome the 
employer's bias favoring younger executives.  Even though age was 
not the sole cause of the decision and Miller would have gotten 
one of the positions if he had been better qualified, Miller 
should have prevailed if he would not have been passed over but 
for his age.  The district court's "sole cause" charge did not 
permit the jury to find in Miller's favor on this basis.  It 
follows that Miller is entitled to a new trial. 
 
VI. 
 We hold that in an ADEA case which does not qualify for 
a burden shifting instruction under Price Waterhouse, a district 
court should instruct the jury that the plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that age played a role in the 
employer's decisionmaking process and that it was a determinative 
factor in the outcome of that process.7  Since the district court 
instructed that age must be shown to be the sole cause of the 
                                                           
7In the course of this opinion, we have relied on Title VII cases 
because the development of the relevant case law under the two 
statutes prior to the Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1991 
followed parallel courses.  It should be noted, however, that the 




employer's decision and since the record would support a 
conclusion that, while other factors played a role, age was a 
determinative factor, we will reverse and remand for a new trial. 
 
                                  
